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1355 
THE FEDERAL RETREAT FROM PROTECTING DEFENDANTS 
FROM TAINTED SHOW-UP IDENTIFICATIONS AND THE 
SUPERIORITY OF NEW YORK’S APPROACH 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
People v. Chuyn1 
(decided December 13, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Manuel Chuyn, the defendant, was charged with two counts 
of third degree assault and one count of second degree burglary.2  The 
defendant moved to reopen a Wade hearing to determine whether 
three eye witnesses’ pretrial show-up identifications of the defendant 
should be suppressed.3  The defendant further moved to have each 
witness testify at the hearing, if reopened.4  According to the defend-
ant, suggestive statements made by the first witness to the two subse-
quent witnesses before they identified the defendant tainted the se-
cond and third identifications.5  The defendant further asserted that 
the purported statements were improperly suggestive, in violation of 
his due process rights, and all evidence of the identifications should 
be suppressed.6  Although a previous Wade hearing had been held 
and decided in the prosecution’s favor, the defendant introduced new 
evidence and claimed it provided grounds to reopen the Wade hear-
ing.7 
The New York Supreme Court granted the defendant's mo-
 
1 No. 2707/2010, 2011 WL 6187150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 13, 2011). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at *2. 
6 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *1. 
7 Id. at *2. 
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tion, finding the new evidence sufficient to reopen the hearing.8  The 
defendant presented notes from the prosecutor’s pretrial witness in-
terviews that showed the first witness had in fact spoken with the 
subsequent witnesses prior to their own identifications.9  Based on an 
examination of pertinent case law, the court found that the police di-
recting an identification procedure constituted state action and may 
be the subject of a Wade hearing.10  An opportunity for improper wit-
ness communication at a police-directed identification procedure ne-
cessitates a Wade hearing.11  In addition, the court granted the de-
fendant's motion requiring the witnesses to testify at the hearing.12  
The court reasoned that the testimony was materially relevant to the 
issue of suggestiveness and necessary to resolve the issue.13  Due to 
the unique circumstances of the purported improper suggestiveness, 
the court clearly established a limited scope for the hearing.14 
This article will review the facts and the court’s reasoning in 
Chuyn.  In addition, this article will analyze the development of the 
federal and New York State approaches to the issue of the admissibil-
ity of pretrial show up identifications influenced by suggestiveness, 
focusing on the similar policy considerations of the respective courts.  
Finally, despite those similarities, this article will show New York's 
departure from the federal approach, providing broader protection to 
defendants and better achieving the policy goals of both courts than 
the federal scheme. 
II. THE OPINION: PEOPLE V. CHUYN 
The pertinent issue before the court was whether the sugges-
tiveness was based solely on the conduct of the first witness or on po-
lice action, and if the latter, whether the identification was tainted 
such that it must be suppressed.15  Three eyewitnesses, James, Sandra 
 
8 Id. at *4, *18. 
9 Id. at *4. 
10 Id. at *11 (finding conduct of private citizens unable to violate an individual’s due pro-
cess rights, only state actor’s conduct). 
11 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *18. 
12 Id. at *6, *18. 
13 Id. at *5-6. 
14 Id. at *6, *12. 
15 See id. at *1 (discussing the relevant issue if the identification was based on police ac-
tion, the evidence from the second and third witnesses was tainted so as to violate the de-
fendant’s due process rights and warrant suppression of the identification). 
2
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and Wendy Juliano, collectively the Julianos,16 identified the defend-
ant at a pretrial show-up identification, directed by the police, forty 
minutes after the incident took place.17 
In a previous Wade hearing, the defendant’s motion to sup-
press the identifications was denied, as was the defendant’s motion to 
compel the testimony of the eyewitnesses at the hearings.18  After this 
prior Wade hearing, the defendant discovered new evidence in the 
form of notes taken by the prosecutor during pre-trial interviews of 
the witnesses, and he sought to reopen the hearing pursuant to Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (“CPL”) section 710.40(4).19  New York law re-
quires the prosecution to provide the defendant with pre-trial wit-
ness’s statements, known as Rosario material, for the purpose of 
cross examination.20  The Rosario notes revealed that the first wit-
ness, Mr. Juliano, spoke to his wife and daughter after he identified 
the defendant, telling them he had identified the guilty party.21  The 
daughter stated that she heard her father say, “You’re not going to be-
lieve this[,] he's downstairs—come down now.”22  Mr. Juliano’s wife 
claimed that she heard him say, “Come downstairs.  I think we have 
the guy.”23  It is important to note, that the police allowed these 
communications to occur.24 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Wade25 
that pre-trial identifications must conform to constitutional due pro-
cess rights.26  Pursuant to Wade, hearings are held to determine the 
 
16 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *2. The three witnesses were family members, a father, 
mother and daughter.  Id. at *1. 
17 Id. at *1, *4. 
18 Id. at *1. 
19 Id. at *2-*3. 
20 People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883 (N.Y. 1961) (holding defendant was entitled to 
witnesses’ pre-trial statements in prosecution’s possession); People v. Consolazio, 354 
N.E.2d 801, 806 (N.Y. 1976) (holding pretrial statements made by prosecution’s witnesses 
must be provided to defendants unless the statements are mere duplicates of those already in 
defendant’s possession). 
21 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *4. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (showing police permitted the first witness to talk to subsequent witnesses). 
25 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
26 Id. at 226-27 (holding defendant’s right to counsel applied to pretrial and trial proceed-
ings, including pretrial identifications). 
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admissibility of pretrial identification evidence at trial.27  In order to 
reopen a previously decided Wade hearing, CPL section 710.40(4)28 
provides that a defendant must show pertinent evidence newly dis-
covered, which could not have been located at the time of the prior 
motion through reasonable efforts.29  Additional pertinent facts need 
not establish suggestiveness on their face, but the facts must relate to 
the issue of suggestiveness such that the outcome of the prior hearing 
would have been “materially affected.”30  Evidence that either un-
dermines a court’s reasoning for previously denying suppression or 
materially strengthens a defendant’s claim of suggestiveness is suffi-
cient to reopen a Wade hearing.31  Once a Wade hearing is reopened, 
evidence that materially supports an improper suggestiveness claim, 
or is necessary to resolve the issue of suggestiveness, is admissible 
even if it was previously excluded.32 
 
27 People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 (N.Y. 1995) (“The purpose of the Wade hear-
ing is to test identification testimony for taint arising from official suggestion during ‘police 
arranged confrontations between a defendant and an eyewitness.’ ”). 
28 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 710.40 (McKinney 1977). 
29 Id. 
If after a pre-trial determination and denial of the motion the court is sat-
isfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts 
have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discov-
ered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion, it 
may permit him to renew the motion before trial or, if such was not pos-
sible owing to the time of the discovery of the alleged new facts, during 
trial. 
Id. 
30 People v. Clark, 670 N.E.2d 980, 981 (N.Y. 1996) (“ ‘[A]dditional pertinent facts’ does 
not require defendant . . . to introduce facts which on their face establish the suggestive-
ness . . . [but rather] the facts asserted [must] be ‘pertinent’ to the issue of official sugges-
tiveness such that they would materially affect or have affected the earlier Wade determina-
tion.”). 
31 People v Delamota, 960 N.E.2d 383, 390-91 (N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he trial court erred when 
it denied defendant's motion to reopen the Wade hearing because . . . trial testimony fatally 
undermined the suppression court's rationale for denying that motion. . . . .  The significant 
revelation to the contrary at trial considerably strengthened defendant's suggestiveness 
claim.”). 
32 See People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (stating “a witness’s testimony 
may be necessary if the evidence presented at the hearing raises substantial issues as to the 
constitutionality of the lineup, the resolution of which could not be properly resolved without 
testimony from the identification witness”); see also People v. Cherry, 812 N.Y.S.2d 550, 
551 (App. Div. 2006) (“[T]his right is generally triggered only when the hearing record rais-
es substantial issues as to the constitutionality of the identification procedure . . . , where the 
People's evidence is ‘notably incomplete . . . ’, or where the defendant otherwise establishes 
a need for the witness’s testimony.” (quoting People v. Santiago, 696 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 
(App. Div. 1999))). 
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In Chuyn, the court found that the defendant could not have 
discovered the Rosario notes prior to the first hearing, and this pro-
vided grounds to reopen the Wade hearing.33  Not only were addi-
tional facts provided, but those new facts also related directly to the 
issue of improper suggestiveness.34  For the first time, evidence of the 
witnesses’ communications was shown, which significantly under-
mined the court’s prior reasoning based on the assumption that the 
witnesses never communicated.35  However, although the defendant 
had shown that two identifications may have been influenced by the 
first witness’s comments, the court’s inquiry was not complete.36  In 
response to the prosecution’s opposition, the court needed to deter-
mine whether the exclusionary rules, arising from due process rights, 
applied to the conduct of a private citizen, like the first witness com-
menting to the subsequent witnesses.37 
In examining various federal and state decisions, the court 
found that exclusionary rules relating to improper suggestiveness are 
intended to deter improper state action or police conduct, and that a 
private citizen’s suggestive behavior could not implicate due process 
protection.38  Additionally, it found that Wade inquiries are designed 
to encourage conformity of state conduct to constitutional due pro-
cess rights.39  Despite this conclusion, the court rejected the prosecu-
 
33 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *4 (“[T]he notes of the ADA presented by on this motion, 
provide new evidence not present at the initial Wade hearing, and which the defendant could 
not have discovered before this court’s determination of the Wade hearing, even with the 
exercise of due diligence.”). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (“This court based its suppression decision on its finding . . . that James Juliano 
made no suggestive statements to his wife or daughter.”). 
36 Id. (“[The] defendant’s claims of suggestiveness have been materially strengthened by 
the newly discovered evidence of the women’s statements.”); id. at *5 (“[T]he substantial 
issues raised by the evidence as to the suggestiveness of the police-arranged show up proce-
dure cannot be properly resolved without the testimony . . . the Wade hearing must be reo-
pened to hear the testimony of the three eyewitnesses.”). 
37 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *5. 
38 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (“Wade and Gilbert fashion exclusion-
ary rules to deter law enforcement authorities from [improper conduct].”); see also Manson 
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977) (stating “totality of circumstances” approach was 
adopted, in part, due to its “influence of police behavior”); People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 
39 (N.Y. 2009) (“The exclusionary rules were fashioned to deter improper conduct on the 
part of law enforcement officials which might lead to mistaken identifications.” (quoting 
People v. Logan, 250 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1969))). 
39 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *8 (“[T]he purpose of inquiry at a Wade hearing under 
federal and New York state constitutional law is to limit the conduct of the state, in conform-
ity with constitutional due process requirements, and that the object of the court’s scrutiny 
are the representatives of the state.”). 
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tion’s assertion that the witness’s comments, as a private citizen, 
could not implicate the defendant’s due process rights.40  The court 
examined state precedent of People v. Dixon41 and People v. 
Delamota,42 and concluded that police conduct in directing an identi-
fication procedure, in itself, may be the subject of a Wade hearing.43  
This was shown first in Dixon where a Wade hearing was granted 
when the witness identified the defendant while canvassing a neigh-
borhood with a police officer.44  Although the identification was in-
stantaneous, a Wade hearing was proper simply because the confron-
tation between the witness and defendant was arranged by the police, 
just as the confrontation was arranged by the police in Chuyn.45  And 
in Delamota, evidence of pretrial photo identification was suppressed 
when the witness’s son, who knew the defendant, translated for the 
witness at police request, but the evidence was only suppressed be-
cause of the police’s choice to use the son as translator, not because 
of any of the son’s actions.46 
Based on these decisions, the court in Chuyn determined that 
the police directed the identification process, which afforded the first 
witness the opportunity to improperly influence the subsequent iden-
tifications.47  This was grounds for a Wade hearing and possible sup-
pression, regardless of the police officers’ intent.48  While directing a 
pretrial identification procedure, the police must actively prevent and 
inhibit improper witness suggestiveness from influencing subsequent 
 
40 Id. at *5, *6. 
41 647 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1995). 
42 960 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 2011). 
43 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *5 (“[T]he hearing would also address . . . the police of-
ficers' conduct which may not have been fully explored at the original Wade hearing, such as 
whether the officers took any steps to avoid the risks inherent in deputizing a civilian to as-
sist in the show-up procedure.”). 
44 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1322. 
45 Id. at 1323 (stating that case law indicates a low standard for qualifying state conduct 
such that a Wade hearing is proper “whenever identification procedures . . . come about at 
the deliberate direction of the state”). 
46 Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391 (“[S]uggestiveness cannot be attributed to the victim's 
son, but to the detective's decision to utilize him as the interpreter notwithstanding the possi-
ble risks that were involved in this practice.”). 
47 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *12. 
48 Id. (“[A]t the reopened Wade hearing, the issue before the court will be whether police 
action in the course of arranging the show up identification . . . resulted in undue suggestive-
ness which impermissibly influenced their identifications.”); People v. Smalls, 490 N.Y.S.2d 
851, 852-53 (App. Div. 1985) (finding police conduct in walking witness passed the defend-
ant's holding cell constituted improper suggestiveness even though it was done unintention-
ally). 
6
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identifications; any inaction on the police’s part may result in exclu-
sion of identifications at a Wade hearing.49  Therefore, the court 
granted the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing.50  In ad-
dition, the court held that the witnesses would testify at the reopened 
hearing because their testimony had the potential of materially 
strengthening the defendant’s claim of improper suggestiveness, and 
was essential in the resolution of the issue.51 
However, although the court granted the defendant’s motion 
to reopen the Wade hearing and required the witnesses to testify, it 
did not grant the defendant the complete scope of inquiry he sought.52  
Because the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the use of 
tainted evidence at trial amounted to a violation of due process rights, 
and that citizen conduct alone can invoke due process rights, a specif-
ic procedure for inquiry was established to focus on the actual police 
action in directing the identification procedure.53  First, the court 
would decide whether the police acted improperly in permitting the 
communication between the witnesses to occur.54 Second, only if the 
police were found to have acted improperly, the court would decide 
whether the first witness’s statements improperly influenced the sub-
sequent identifications.55 
Having granted the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade 
hearing, and having established the clear and limited scope of inquiry 
 
49 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *12 (stating the “police action or inaction in ensuring 
[Mr. Juliano] would do nothing to taint the reliability of any identification made by his wife 
or daughter” will be examined at the hearing). 
50 Id. (reopening Wade hearing to examine police conduct in directing identification only). 
51 Id. at *4 (“[The] defendant’s claims of suggestiveness have been materially strength-
ened by the newly discovered evidence of the women’s statements.”); id. at *5 (“[T]he sub-
stantial issues raised by the evidence as to the suggestiveness of the police-arranged show-up 
procedure cannot be properly resolved without the testimony . . . the Wade hearing must be 
reopened to hear the testimony of the three eye witnesses.”). 
52 Id. at *11 (“[B]ecause defendant's contention that Wade suppression review should en-
tail consideration of procedures which are entirely devoid of governmental action does not 
reflect current federal or New York State constitutional law, it is rejected.”). 
53  Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *10 (“[A]dmission of identification evidence may not be 
found violative of due process in the absence of a finding of a very substantial likelihood of 
misidentification . . . attributable to an unduly suggestive procedure by the police.” (citing 
Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 40 (“[W]e decline to extend a per se constitutional rule of exclusion to 
cases where identification results from a suggestive communication by a private citizen.”))). 
54 Id. *12 (“[I]n the first instance, on whether Mr. Juliano’s conduct was attributable to 
police action or inaction in ensuring that he would do nothing to taint the reliability of any 
identifications made by his wife or daughter.”). 
55 Id. (“[Then] the inquiry will focus . . . on the conduct of Mr. Juliano and its effect on 
the female witnesses’ identifications of defendant.”). 
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for that hearing, the court addressed two additional assertions made 
by the prosecution in opposition.56  First, the court rejected the prose-
cution’s claim that informal police-directed identifications, such as 
this show-up identification, deserve less scrutiny than formal proce-
dures, such as police-arranged line-ups.57  And, second, although un-
usual, the witnesses’ testimony at the reopened hearing is not an im-
proper pretrial examination because the defendant’s inquiries will be 
limited to the topic of the purported suggestiveness, focusing first on 
the police officer’s conduct and then the witnesses’ communication.58 
Finally, the court discussed the governing procedure and pos-
sible outcomes of the Wade hearing.59  First, the defendant must 
make a prima facie showing that the procedure was unduly sugges-
tive based on the totality of the circumstances.60  If the defendant 
does not meet the burden, both pretrial and in-court identifications 
are admissible; however, if the defendant does meet the burden, an 
independent source hearing will be held to determine the witnesses’ 
reliability.61  Then the prosecution must show, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the identification was reliably based on the wit-
ness’s observations of the crime, not the improper identification pro-
cedure.62  An identification’s reliability is shown by evidence 
supporting the identification independent from the improper identifi-
cation procedure at an independent source hearing.63 
Discussing this procedure, the court in Chuyn pointed out the 
diversion in approaches of the federal and New York State courts.64  
Although federal cases hold that pretrial and in-court identifications 
produced from an improperly suggestive procedure found to be relia-
ble are admissible, the New York rule excludes evidence of such pre-
 
56 Id. at *6. 
57 Id.  (showing the New York Court of Appeals  treated photo, lineup and show-up iden-
tifications the same). 
58  Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at * 6. 
59 Id. at *8, *9. 
60 Id. (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). 
61 Id. at *12 (citing People v. Peterkin, 543 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (App. Div. 1989) (“[O]nly 
when the defense has established that a pretrial identification procedure was unduly sugges-
tive, after the prosecution has met its initial burden of going forward to demonstrate reason-
ableness and the lack of suggestiveness, that evidence concerning an independent source for 
the in-court identification must be elicited from the complainant.” (quoting People v. 
Tweedy, 521 N.Y.S.2d 92, 92 (App. Div. 1987)))). 
62 Id. 
63 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *12. 
64 Id. at *9. 
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trial identifications; only in-court identifications are admissible if 
found to be reliable.65 
Therefore, in Chuyn, if the identifications in question are 
found to be the product of improper influence, all evidence of pretrial 
identifications must be suppressed.66  An independent source hearing 
should be held, but only for the purpose of determining the admissi-
bility of in-court identifications.67  Thus, under this approach, the 
court in Chuyn reopened the Wade hearing within a specific and con-
strained scope, despite the fact that the actual suggestiveness was at-
tributed to a private citizen. 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
To better understand the current federal approach to due pro-
cess protections and the suppression of pretrial identification evi-
dence, an examination of its origin and development is helpful.  On 
June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of landmark cas-
es conclusively establishing that pretrial identifications implicate due 
process rights.68 
In the seminal cases of United States v. Wade,69 and its com-
panion Gilbert v. California,70 the Supreme Court held that a defend-
ant’s federal due process right to counsel arising from the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits pretrial identifications without defense coun-
sel.71  In both cases, the Court excluded all testimony of pretrial iden-
tifications, but remanded the cases for determination as to the admis-
 
65 See id. (“[U]nder the federal constitutional scheme, pretrial identification evidence re-
sulting from an unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged procedure will not be automatically 
excluded, but will be evaluated for its reliability under the totality of circumstances stand-
ard.” (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114)); but see id. (“[U]nder New York law, improper 
identification procedure and evidence derived from them must be suppressed, but in-court 
identifications may nevertheless be allowed, where based upon an independent source.” (cit-
ing Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 39)). 
66 Id. at *12. 
67 Id. 
68 The Supreme Court decided all three cases, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
(1967) on June 12, 1967. 
69 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
70 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
71 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 226, 237 (holding due process rights entitle defendants to have 
defense present at pretrial identifications); see also Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 (holding the de-
fendant’s due process rights have been violated by the pretrial lineup held in the absence of 
defense counsel). 
9
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sibility of subsequent in-court identifications.72 
The third decision, Stovall v. Denno,73 established due process 
rights protection from pretrial identifications influenced by improper 
suggestiveness by stating that if “the confrontation . . . was so unnec-
essarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica-
tion [then the defendant] was denied due process of law.”74  In 
Stovall, the police brought the defendant, who was suspected of mur-
der, to the hospital alone and handcuffed, where the only living eye-
witness identified him as the perpetrator.75  The defendant’s motion 
to suppress based on suggestiveness was denied, as the Court applied 
a “totality of circumstances” test, and found that exigent circum-
stances justified the identification procedure.76  Even though the 
Court did not suppress the identification, the Stovall decision was 
groundbreaking because for the first time federal due process rights 
were held to protect against pretrial identifications influenced by 
suggestiveness.77  This effectively shifted review of certain testimony 
from the purview of the jury in determining credibility to the court to 
determine suggestiveness and reliability.78 
Despite its importance, the Stovall decision created confusion.  
First, in discussing suggestiveness, the Court indicated admissibility 
was couched in reliability, but admitted evidence of the identification 
 
72 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240 (“Where, as here, the admissibility of evidence of the lineup 
identification itself is not involved, a per se rule of exclusion of court room identification 
would be unjustified.”); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73 (holding only a per se rule of exclusion 
for pretrial identifications will properly operate as a deterrent to improper police conduct, but 
“the State [has] the opportunity to establish that the in-court identifications had an independ-
ent source”). 
73 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
74 Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 295. 
76 Id. at 302 (“[A] claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confronta-
tion depends on the totality of circumstances surrounding it, and the record in the present 
case reveals that the showing of Stovall to [the witness] in an immediate hospital confronta-
tion was imperative.”).  The Court also denied the defendant’s motion on Wade and Gilbert 
grounds, despite defense counsel’s absence, because the Court refused to apply the rule ret-
roactively.  Id. at 300 (“[R]etroactive application of Wade and Gilbert would seriously dis-
rupt the administration of our criminal laws.”). 
77 Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pre-
trial Identification Procedures:  An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 263 (1991) 
(identifying that prior to 1967 the Supreme Court had not considered whether a defendant’s 
due process rights could be implicated in a pretrial identification procedure). 
78 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299-300 (“The overwhelming majority of American courts have 
always treated the evidence question not as one of admissibility but as one of credibility for 
the jury.”). 
10
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based on exigent circumstances, unrelated to reliability.79  The identi-
fication was termed “imperative,” because it was unclear whether the 
witness would survive to make a formal identification after being 
stabbed eleven times.80  Despite characterizing its analysis as a “total-
ity of circumstances” approach, confusion over the proper factors to 
be considered resulted because the Court gave no guidance on what 
to consider.81 
Second, unlike the Wade and Gilbert decisions, the Court did 
not explicitly address pretrial and in-court identifications separately.82  
This created a split among the lower courts, in which some courts 
used a single test where reliability established both pretrial and in-
court identifications as being admissible,83 while other courts re-
quired a dual test where pretrial identifications influenced by improp-
er suggestiveness were per se inadmissible but in-court identifications 
were admissible upon a finding of reliability.84  Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court found that due process rights, arising from the United 
 
79 Id. at 298 (“Wade and Gilbert rules also are aimed at avoiding unfairness at trial by en-
hancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of identification evidence.”); id. 
at 302 (“[The witness] was the only person . . . who could possibly exonerate Stovall . . . .  
No one knew how long [the witness] might live . . . the police followed the only feasible 
procedure.”). 
80 Id. 
81 See People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 382 (N.Y. 1981) (finding show up identifica-
tions to be suggestive when a police officer told the witnesses that he believed the police had 
arrested the guilty party prior to the witnesses’ identification of the defendant); but see John-
son v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding show ups to be suggestive only 
when police influence an identification).  Compare People v. Owens, 541 N.E.2d 400, 400 
(N.Y. 1989) (finding defendant’s unique jacket suggestive), with State v. Haymon, 639 
S.W.2d 843, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding lineup not suggestive despite defendant's 
unique scarred face). 
82 See generally Stovall, 388 U.S. 293 (remaining silent on the distinction of pretrial show 
up identification and in court identifications). 
83 See United States ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217, 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(holding evidence of single person show up identification admissible despite being proce-
durally suggestive because the witness testified to studying the criminal’s face to positively 
identify him such that the totality of circumstances did not show likelihood of misidentifica-
tion); Gregory v. United States, 410 F.2d 1016, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding both identifi-
cations to be admissible, despite a showing of suggestiveness, because a number of factors 
indicated reliability of the identification and the jury would have the opportunity to consider 
the reliability of the testimony). 
84 But see Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1973) (suppressing pretrial identi-
fication evidence because the “confrontation was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive 
to irreparable mistaken identification,” without examining reliability); Rudd v. Florida, 477 
F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973) (excluding testimony of pretrial identifications influenced by 
official suggestiveness, but stating a showing of exigent circumstances or reliability may jus-
tify admission of in court identification). 
11
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States Constitution, protected against pretrial identifications influ-
enced by suggestiveness, and may constitute grounds for the suppres-
sion of such evidence.85 
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court consistently lim-
ited and eroded the federal due process rights established in Stovall.  
In Simmons v. United States,86 the Court for the first time applied the 
Stovall holding.87  An in-court identification was deemed proper, de-
spite the fact that police showed the witness photographs of the de-
fendant before trial.88  The Court examined the “totality of the cir-
cumstances,” considering factors such as the seriousness of the crime, 
the evasiveness of the perpetrators, and the low amount of additional 
evidence.89  However, these factors were different from those that 
controlled the Stovall decision, the necessity of the identification, due 
to the concern that the only witness would not survive to make a 
proper identification, and the focus on reliability.90  In Simmons, the 
Court ignored factors regarding the preservation of evidence or the 
witness’s reliability, and focused instead on broader factors, greatly 
weakening due process protections from improper suggestiveness.91 
In further erosion of Stovall protections, the Court in Simmons 
heightened the standard for establishing improper suggestiveness 
stating that “a pretrial identification . . . will be set aside on that 
ground only if the . . . identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification.”92  The standard established in Stovall, a proce-
dure “conducive” to misidentification, was rejected in favor of the 
heightened standard of a “very substantial likelihood” of misidentifi-
cation.93 
Despite the Court’s hesitancy to exclude the pretrial identifi-
cation in Stovall and the Court’s relaxation of protection in Simmons, 
in Foster v. California,94 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction on 
 
85 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02. 
86 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
87 Id. at 384 (“This standard accords with our resolution of a similar issue in Stovall v. 
Denno.”). 
88 Id. at 384-85. 
89 Id. (considering factors other than reliability or exigency determination). 
90 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (considering exigent circumstances). 
91 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384-85. 
92 Id. at 384 (emphasis added). 
93 Id. 
94 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
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due process grounds due to a pretrial identification procedure.95  The 
witness could not identify the defendant at the two lineups, despite 
the defendant’s conspicuous appearance in the lineup as the tallest 
individual and the only one wearing a leather jacket.96  The witness 
then spoke to the defendant before identifying him at a third lineup in 
which he was the only individual from the previous lineup.97  The 
Court spoke of the jury’s role, indicating some circumstances are be-
yond the jury’s latitude to determine credibility.98  It stated that a pre-
trial identification “may be so defective as to make the identification 
constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law.”99  However, factors 
for determining the admissibility of pretrial identifications remained 
unclear.  In addition, although the Court remanded the case for retrial, 
it was silent as to whether both the pretrial and in-court identifica-
tions were inadmissible or simply the pretrial identification.100 
Hesitancy to exclude pretrial identification evidence due to 
suggestiveness, and confusion among the lower courts, persisted 
when the Court decided Coleman v. Alabama.101  In Coleman, the 
Court found that the lineup identification was suggestive yet not fa-
tally tainted, despite the defendant being the only member of the 
lineup to wear a hat like the attacker.102  The Court permitted the 
identification into evidence because “the [trial] court could find . . . 
[the] identifications were entirely based upon observations at the time 
of the assault and not at all induced by the conduct of the lineup.”103  
The Court essentially downplayed the importance of pretrial identifi-
cations to a defendant’s ability to assert an effective defense, eroding 
the Wade decision’s characterization of pretrial identifications as a 
“critical stage” in trials.104  And, unlike the defendant’s jacket in Fos-
ter, it was held that the wearing of the hat by the defendant did not 
 
95 Id. at 443 (“The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all but in-
evitable that [the witness] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact ‘the 
man.’ . . . [t]his procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to 
violate due process.”). 
96 Id. at 441-42. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 447. 
99 Foster, 394 U.S. at 442 n.2. 
100 Id. at 444. 
101 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
102 Id. at 6. 
103 Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
104 Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37 (“[T]here can be little doubt that for Wade the post-
indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution.”) (emphasis added). 
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violate his due process rights because the police were not responsible 
for his wearing it.105 
In 1972, the Supreme Court began explaining the unanswered 
questions in Neil v. Biggers.106  First, the Court, focusing on the prob-
ability of misidentification, defined the applicable test for finding im-
proper suggestiveness in terms of the outcome of an identification 
procedure, instead of the identification procedure itself.107  The Court 
stated that a defendant is protected against suggestiveness influencing 
identifications because it is the “likelihood of misidentification” that 
violates a defendant’s due process rights.108 
Second, having shed some light on suggestiveness, the Court 
explained the role of a finding of reliability by explicitly rejecting a 
per se exclusionary rule for tainted pretrial identification.109  The 
Court held identifications arising from suggestive procedures admis-
sible upon a finding of reliability.110  Therefore, suppression is proper 
only when a pretrial identification procedure is improperly suggestive 
and the identification produced therefrom is not reliable.111 
In further clarification, the Court enumerated five factors to 
be considered in evaluating the reliability of an identification: 
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal 
at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of atten-
tion, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of 
the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation, and the length of time be-
tween the crime and the confrontation.112 
Extending Biggers, the Court applied that decision in Manson 
 
105 See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 6 (“[N]othing in the record shows that [defendant] was re-
quired to [wear the hat]”); but see Foster, 394 U.S. at 443 (taking defendant’s leather jacket 
into consideration). 
106 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
107 Id. at 198 (“It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right 
to due process. . . .  [s]uggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the 
likelihood of misidentification.”). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 198-99. 
110 Id. at 201 (holding that the witness’s “record for reliability was thus a good one . . . 
[and] [w]eighing all the factors, [the Court found] no substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
tion.  The evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury”). 
111 Biggers, 408 U.S. at 201. 
112 Id. at 199-200. 
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v. Brathwaite113 to federal due process protections in state courts, 
arising from the Fourteenth Amendment.114  Pretrial identifications 
made in the presence of improper suggestiveness were found to be 
admissible upon a reliability showing, and the five reliability factors 
enumerated in Biggers were adopted.115 
The Court emphatically reiterated the importance of the focus 
on reliability: “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admis-
sibility of identification testimony.”116  However, the Court’s dicta in 
Brathwaite alluded to additional factors that the court had previously 
considered: “[T]he second factor is deterrence . . .  [as] [t]he police 
will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures . . . [and] [t]he 
third factor is the effect on the administration of justice.”117 
In sum, since the Supreme Court established that pretrial pro-
ceedings invoke federal due process rights and protect defendants 
from identifications arising from improperly suggestive proceedings, 
the Court has been hesitant to suppress evidence or overturn convic-
tions on those terms.118  Further, subsequent decisions have only 
eroded and limited this protection. 
V. THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
The New York State Constitution contains a due process 
clause119 essentially identical in language to that of the United States 
Constitution.120  As a result, the New York approach is quite similar 
 
113 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
114 Id. at 110 (“[A] per se approach is not mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
115 Id. at 114 (“The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers.”). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 112.  Interestingly, the court in Chuyn examined Brathwaite in determining that 
Wade hearings may only inquire as to the conduct of state actors. 
118 In fact, the Supreme Court has only reversed one conviction on these grounds.  See 
Foster, 394 U.S. 440 (reversing a conviction based on testimony of a pretrial show up identi-
fication influenced by improper suggestiveness). 
119 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law.”). 
120  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
15
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to the federal scheme of applying due process rights to pretrial identi-
fications influenced by suggestiveness.  However, because the United 
States Constitution and the rules arising from it dictate only minimum 
protections that states may not infringe upon, some state constitutions 
provide greater protection.121  In Chuyn, the court recognized New 
York’s broader protection and applied it.122 
Following the Supreme Court’s trilogy of decisions in 1967, 
New York courts began holding Wade hearings to determine the ad-
missibility of improperly produced pretrial identifications.123  In Peo-
ple v. Ballot,124 the New York Court of Appeals, confronting its first 
major issue regarding pretrial identifications influenced by sugges-
tiveness,125 stated, “[the] pretrial identification procedure, even 
though not violative of the defendant’s right to counsel or his privi-
lege against self-incrimination, may be so unfair as to amount to a 
denial of due process of law.”126  Applying this theory, a police sta-
tion identification made one year after the crime, when the defendant 
was alone in a room and forced to wear a hat and jacket like the per-
petrator, was held to be “grossly and unnecessarily suggestive” and 
was excluded.127  However, a per se exclusionary rule was not explic-
itly adopted.128  Similar to the federal approach, the court in Ballot 
held in-court identifications reliably based on observations of the 
crime, not the identification procedure, were admissible.129 
 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
121 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383 (“[T]he State Constitution affords additional protections 
above the bare minimum mandated by Federal law.”). 
122 Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *11 (“This court is bound to apply the New York Court 
of Appeals’ holding.”). 
123 See People v. Brown, 229 N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1967) (discussing Wade). 
124 233 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1967). 
125 Id. at 105 (deciding whether to suppress evidence of an identification made at a police 
station). 
126 Id. at 106. 
127 Id. at 107. 
128 See generally Ballot, 233 N.E.2d 103 (remaining silent on whether the court had 
adopted a per se exclusionary rule).  This can also be seen by the fact that New York courts 
post-Ballot did not consistently apply a per se rule of exclusion.  See People v. Walker, 411 
N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Crim. Ct. 1978) (finding no per se exclusionary rule, instead, if the on-
the-scene showup “confrontation is thus deemed under circumstances consistent with such 
rights as an accused person may derive under the constitution of this state or of the United 
States, it should be admissible at trial”). 
129 Ballot, 233 N.E.2d at 107. 
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In People v. Rahming,130 decided in 1970, the Court of Ap-
peals showed a greater tendency to enforce state due process rights 
regarding pretrial identifications than the federal approach.  The court 
excluded both pretrial and in-court identifications when the witness 
identified the defendant in police photographs, leading to his arrest 
that day and the witness’s lineup identification the following day.131  
This decision, rooted in New York State’s Constitution, excluded 
identifications made after the witnesses had been shown photographs 
of the defendant even though the Supreme Court refused to suppress 
an identification made in the same circumstances two years earlier in 
Simmons.132  Despite the similar facts and the same burden of proof 
on the prosecution, that of clear and convincing evidence, the Su-
preme Court’s and the New York Court of Appeals’ decisions were 
contradictory.133 
New York’s trend of providing broader protection, despite 
failing to expressly depart from the federal approach, was also visible 
in the lower courts.  In People v. Lebron,134 the defendant was identi-
fied by a witness at a pretrial lineup in which he was the only Hispan-
ic, as all other line up members were Caucasian.135  Not only did the 
court exclude the evidence of the lineup identification, but at an inde-
pendent hearing any possible in-court identifications were also ex-
cluded for lack of independent source evidence.136  Interestingly, the 
court focused its analysis only on the actual lineup procedure, not the 
mitigating factors such as exigent circumstances or reliability based 
on supporting evidence, as the federal courts had done.137  Similarly, 
in People v. Johnson,138 the court focused almost exclusively on the 
 
130 259 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 1970). 
131 Id. at 730-31. 
132 Compare Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384 (holding, only two years prior to Rahming, sugges-
tive photos shown to the witness prior to identification insufficient to require exclusion), 
with People v. Wilson, 835 N.E.2d 1220, 1221 (N.Y. 2005) (holding witness viewing de-
fendant’s photo prior to the identification constituted improper suggestiveness). 
133 Rahming, 259 N.E.2d at 730 (“[R]equiring the prosecution to establish by ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ that it was neither the product of, nor affected by, the improper pretrial 
showup.”). 
134 360 N.Y.S.2d 468 (App. Div. 1974). 
135 Id. at 471. 
136 Id. (“[I]t ‘became incumbent upon the People to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the identification was based upon visual observation’ by [the witness] at the time 
of the incident . . . we find the People failed to do [so].”). 
137 See generally People v. Lebron, 360 N.Y.S.2d 468 (App. Div. 1974) (discussing only 
the lineup procedure, but ignoring evidence of reliability or exigent circumstances). 
138 433 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1980). 
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pretrial identification procedure, rather than the identification it pro-
duced, and excluded evidence of the pretrial identification.139  In ad-
dition, because the prosecution showed independent source evidence 
supporting the witness’s identification, a subsequent in-court identifi-
cation was allowed.140  This decision indicated support for the adop-
tion of a per se exclusionary rule because the court had sufficient evi-
dence to admit the pretrial identification as reliable, as shown by the 
fact that the in court identification was allowed, but instead chose to 
exclude it.141  As a result, the case had the same decision as if a per se 
exclusionary rule had governed. 
In People v. Adams,142 New York’s trend of interpreting 
greater protection under the state constitution culminated by the 
Court of Appeals expressly departing from the federal approach, in-
stead adopting a per se exclusionary rule for pretrial identifications 
influenced by improper suggestiveness.143  Although the pretrial 
show-up identifications were found reliable,144 only in-court identifi-
cations were admissible.145  In deciding Adams, the court rejected the 
federal approach,146 yet it echoed the Supreme Court’s focus on relia-
bility: “The rule for excluding improper pretrial identifications . . . is 
designed to reduce the risk that the wrong person will be convict-
ed.”147  However, the court also acknowledged the exclusionary 
rule’s deterrence on improper police conduct, but its significance was 
diminished in favor of a view focusing on the preservation of “a reli-
able determination of guilt or innocence,” just as the Supreme Court 
had espoused.148  The court further reasoned that a per se rule was not 
 
139 Id. at 479 (holding evidence of pretrial identification must be suppressed due to the 
unnecessarily suggestive lineup procedure in which the defendant was the only person on the 
lineup wearing the same jacket as the witness’s description). 
140 Id. (“[T]he observations of the witness . . . provided an independent basis for the in-
court identification.  Accordingly . . . the witness will not be precluded from identifying the 
perpetrator at any trial.”). 
141 Id. 
142 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981). 
143 Id. at 383 (“After the Supreme Court condemned the practice of police arranged 
showups and established minimum standards for pretrial identifications this court found that 
additional protections were needed under the State Constitution.”); id. at 384 (“[A] pretrial 
identification would not be admissible if the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive.”). 
144 Id. (stating the identifications were supported by evidence, and corroborated by the in-
court identifications of other witnesses). 
145 Id. 
146 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (rejecting a per se exclusionary rule). 
147 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383. 
148 Id.; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112 (considering the exclusionary rules deterrence on im-
18
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a change in law but merely the formal establishment of an already 
developed law,149 and that this was fairest because the prosecution 
could still present in-court identifications when reliable150 and presen-
tation of both identifications could lead the jury to incorrectly attrib-
ute credibility as each identification would bolster credibility of the 
other.151 
Thus, the court in Adams created a drastic change from the 
federal approach by providing greater due process protection, and in 
doing so it formed the modern New York State approach.  Now, in 
New York courts, defendants are protected from pretrial identifica-
tions produced from a police directed identification procedure, influ-
enced by improper suggestiveness, regardless of reliability.152 
VI. THE SUPERIORITY OF NEW YORK’S BROADER PROTECTION 
In granting the defendant’s motion, the court in Chuyn in 
large part applied both federal and state law.153  Due to the large de-
gree of similarity between the laws, most issues did not require dis-
tinguishing the applicable law for resolution.154  However, the court 
relied on New York law at times because of the one significant dis-
tinction between the approaches.  New York has a per se rule of ex-
clusion, but the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected a per 
 
proper police conduct, but focusing on reliability). 
149 See Ballot, 233 N.E.2d at 106 (applying a per se exclusionary rule without expressly 
adopting it). 
150 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (“Excluding evidence of a suggestive show-up does not de-
prive the prosecutor of reliable evidence of guilt.  The witness would still be permitted to 
identify the defendant in-court if that identification is based on an independent source.”). 
151 Id. (“[I]f the jury finds the in-court identification not entirely convincing it should not 
be permitted to resolve its doubts by relying on the fact that the witness had identified the 
defendant on a prior occasion if that identification was made under inherently suggestive 
circumstances.”). 
152 See People v. Sapp, 469 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1983) (applying the per se ex-
clusionary rule to exclude evidence of a pretrial identification, despite the prosecution’s 
showing of reliability); see also People v. Tatum, 492 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1985) 
(allowing an in court identification but suppressing evidence of a pretrial identification influ-
enced by improper suggestiveness regardless of a finding of reliability due to per se exclu-
sionary rule); 33 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Procedure § 2070 (2012) (“[E]vidence of a pre-
trial identification is per se inadmissible if the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive.”). 
153 See generally Chuyn, 2011 WL 6187150, at *18. 
154 See, e.g., id. at *8 (“[T]he purpose of inquiry at a Wade hearing under federal and New 
York state constitutional law is to limit the conduct of the state.”); id. at *11 (stating that 
“because defendant's contention that Wade suppression review should entail consideration of 
procedures which are entirely devoid of governmental action does not reflect current federal 
or New York State constitutional law, it is rejected”). 
19
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se rule of exclusion.155  Although the New York and federal ap-
proaches are similar and based on constitutions containing nearly 
identical language, the New York approach affords defendants great-
er due process protection with respect to pretrial identifications.156 
Upon evaluation of applicable New York case law, it appears, 
the New York approach, as applied, is superior to the federal ap-
proach.  This is because it better achieves the policy considerations 
both approaches have been structured upon: the reliability of the 
identification, the deterrence of improper police conduct, and the ad-
ministration of justice.157  In other words, the various policy consid-
erations essentially amount to an interest in providing a fair trial and 
deterring police misconduct; New York’s approach does both more 
effectively than the federal approach.158 
First, both approaches are concerned with the reliability of 
identifications because misidentification increases the chance of an 
improper conviction.
 159  Inherently in the difference in the rules, it 
can be seen that the federal rejection of a per se exclusionary rule 
risks a larger category of cases that may admit unreliable identifica-
tion evidence in federal courts: all cases in which identifications are 
 
155 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112 (rejecting per se exclusion rule); but see Adams, 423 
N.E.2d at 384 (adopting per se exclusionary rule). 
156 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112; but see Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384. 
157 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-201 (discussing the importance of reliable testimony, and the 
exclusionary rules deterrent effect on improper police conduct); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112, 
114 (stating expressly that the first policy consideration is the preservation of reliable evi-
dence, the second consideration is the deterrent effect on police conduct, and the third factor 
is the exclusionary rules effect on the administration of justice); Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 382-
84 (discussing the reasoning for adopting a per se exclusionary rule is based on the interest 
of preserving reliable testimony, and the rule’s inconsequential effect on the administration 
of justice). 
158 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (“The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by 
the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (emphasizing the 
fact that exclusionary rules are intended to preserve reliable evidence for the purpose of 
providing a fair trial); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 298 (“[T]he Wade and Gilbert rules also are aimed 
at avoiding unfairness at the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in 
the area of identification evidence.”); David E. Paseltiner, Note:  Twenty-Years Of Diminish-
ing Protection: A Proposal To Return To The Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 583, 607 (1987) (“[A] standard similar to the one used in New York [meets] the goals 
of the Wade trilogy, namely sanctions on police misconduct and a fair trial for defendants.”). 
159 See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (“[The] likelihood of misidentification . . . violates a de-
fendant’s right to due process . . . suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they 
increase the likelihood of misidentification.”); see also Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 
(“[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”); 
see also Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383 (“[T]he rule excluding improper pretrial identifica-
tions . . . is designed to reduce the risk that the wrong person will be convicted.”). 
20
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found to be improperly influenced but also incorrectly reliable.  New 
York’s only risk is that an identification will not be found to have 
been improperly influenced in error.  In fact, empirical evidence 
shows that despite mounting criticism, the federal courts continue to 
admit almost all pretrial and in court identifications even if improper 
suggestiveness is found.160 
Further, the federal test for establishing the reliability of an 
identification is subjective in nature, which may result in inconsistent 
holdings among cases with similar facts.161  Whereas New York’s 
bright line per se exclusionary rule lessens the subjectivity, only re-
quiring a subjective finding of suggestiveness, not reliability as well, 
it thus provides greater consistency.  In addition, such subjectivity 
may result in a judge, who has already been privy to evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt, admitting evidence based on his or her own as-
sumption of the defendant’s guilt.162 
Second, the Supreme Court’s rejection of a per se exclusion-
ary rule weakens due process deterrence of improper state action be-
cause the police know influenced identifications may still be admitted 
at trial, not necessarily excluded.163  In fact, it appears that police de-
 
160 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny: An Empirical Analysis of American 
Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 175, 224-25 (2012) (“The data from the 1,471 
federal cases thus show that Manson has been an inadequate mechanism for protecting 
against the admission of unreliable eyewitness evidence . . . .  [The current rule] is an inade-
quate tool for protecting against the admission of tainted procedures and unreliable evi-
dence.”). 
161 In addition to issues of subjectivity, the reliability test has been criticized because the 
five factors set out in Biggers are devoid of any scientific basis, and in fact, have been dis-
proved as effective means of evaluating reliability in certain studies.  See Kahn-Fogel, supra 
note 160, at 176 (explaining study which found reliability factors inconsistent with actual 
reliability); see also Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 276 (“Psychological studies demonstrate 
that each of the factors identified by the Court, and subsequently applied by the inferior fed-
eral and state courts, is either unsupported as a scientific matter or dangerously incom-
plete.”); see also Jessica Lee, Note: No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects 
From The Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755, 769-
70 (2005) (discussing a study, which showed many admitted identifications were actually 
incorrect). 
162 Lee, supra note 161, at 789 (“Thus, if the judge, performing the role of the jury before 
either side has appropriately presented its case, determines that a defendant is probably 
guilty anyway, the testimony is likely to be admitted.”); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 118 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (“[I]n evaluating the admissibility of particular identification testimony 
it is sometimes difficult to put other evidence of guilt entirely to one side.”). 
163 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 125 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that po-
lice would not be deterred unless a per se exclusionary rule was adopted); see also Lee, su-
pra note 161, at 796 (arguing for courts to take affirmative steps to put the police on notice 
of possible evidence exclusion to encourage proper conduct); see also Evan J. Mandery, Le-
gal Development:  Due Process Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 
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partments across the nation still utilize show up identifications, in-
stead of more reliable procedures, such as lineups.164  In contrast, 
New York’s harsh penalty of absolute exclusion increases the deter-
rent effect because the police are on notice that they must make all 
possible steps to direct a neutral identification, and that failure to do 
so may result in lost evidence or, ultimately, a lost conviction.165  
This additional notice, in turn, increases the reliability of identifica-
tions because police will monitor identifications more closely, thus 
lending additional support to the reliability policy as well.166  The 
more the reliable the evidence used, the fairer a trial will be. 
Third, consideration of the administration of justice is also 
better served by New York’s approach.  This is because it consistent-
ly limits the admissibility of pretrial show up identifications to situa-
tions where the identification provides greater probative value than 
prejudicial effect.  Unlike the federal approach, New York’s ap-
proach preserves the jury’s ability to accurately assess a testimony’s 
credibility because jurors will not consider both identifications, in 
court and pretrial, which support each other despite arising from a 
single observation, thus it does not prejudice the defendant.167 
In addition, it does not prejudice the prosecution because even 
if evidence from a pretrial identification is excluded, the prosecution 
may present an in-court identification upon a showing that the identi-
 
389, 421 (1996) (arguing rejection of a per se exclusionary rule for in-court identification 
provides no deterrence) (emphasis added); see also Paseltiner, supra note 158, at 606 (“As a 
deterrent to suggestive police practices, the federal standard is quite weak.”). 
164 Lee, supra note 161, at 768 (“The method [show up identification] is still routinely 
used in the field and in the stationhouse.”). 
165 See Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383 (stating per se exclusionary has greater weight as deter-
rent); see also Sapp, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (suppressing pretrial identification evidence based 
solely on police misconduct); Tatum, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 1009 (allowing an in court identifica-
tion because independent source evidence supported identification, but suppressing evidence 
of a pretrial identification due to police misconduct); see also Paseltiner, supra note 158, at 
606 (“In New York, however, a state which has expressly declined to follow Brathwaite, 
court decisions have put greater pressure on the police.”). 
166 Lee, supra note 161, at 796. 
167 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (“[I]f the jury finds the in-court identification not entirely 
convincing it should not be permitted to resolve its doubts by relying on the fact that the wit-
ness had identified the defendant on a prior occasion if that identification was made under 
inherently suggestive circumstances.”); id. (noting concern over a jury’s ability to determine 
credibility when one identification may be used to support the other identification); 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The evidence of an additional, 
properly conducted confrontation will be more persuasive to a jury, thereby increasing the 
chance of a justified conviction where a reliable identification was tainted by a suggestive 
confrontation.”). 
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fication is reliable.168  As such, the court examines all evidence and 
only that evidence found unreliable is excluded; that is no more prej-
udicial than the exclusion of any other tainted evidence, which is an 
essential element to a fair trial.169  Therefore, in comparison, the fed-
eral approach may prejudice the defendant when either an unreliable 
identification is mistakenly admitted or the jury incorrectly assesses 
credibility due to the mutual support in court and pretrial identifica-
tions offer each other.  But, under the New York approach, neither 
the prosecution nor the defendant is prejudiced. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In New York, unlike the federal system, testimony of pretrial 
identifications produced from an improperly suggestive procedure is 
per se inadmissible.170  This rule more strongly encourages proper po-
lice conduct because the greater penalty for improper conduct acts as 
a stronger incentive to act appropriately.171  Additionally, New 
York’s per se rule decreases prejudice to the defendant, as fewer un-
reliable identifications will be used, thus decreasing improper convic-
tions.172  And when the identification is reliable, the prosecution will 
still be afforded the right to present an in-court identification.173  In 
contrast, under the federal approach the admission of improperly 
tainted identifications might occur, prejudicing the defendant.174  De-
fendants can only present evidence to the jury of the purported sug-
gestiveness while the prosecution has the benefit of the identifica-
 
168 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (“Excluding evidence of a suggestive showup does not de-
prive the prosecutor of reliable evidence of guilt. The witness would still be permitted to 
identify the defendant in court if that identification is based on an independent source.”). 
169 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating concern over reliable 
evidence should not dictate whether a per se rule exclusionary rule is adopted or not because 
other types of evidence are similarly excluded on a regular basis). 
170 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112 (majority opinion) (rejecting per se exclusion rule); 
but see Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (adopting per se exclusionary rule). 
171 Paseltiner, supra note 158, at 606 (“As a deterrent to suggestive police practices, the 
federal standard is quite weak . . . .  In New York, however, a state which has expressly de-
clined to follow Brathwaite, court decisions have put greater pressure on the police.”). 
172 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84 (discussing per se rules advantages in decreasing im-
proper convictions); Lee, supra note 161, at 799 (“Mistaken identifications punish the inno-
cent, leave the guilty free, and the system’s mandate unfulfilled.”). 
173 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (stating the prosecution may present in court identifications 
found to be reliable). 
174 Id. 
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tions supporting the other.175 Therefore, New York’s superior preser-
vation of reliable evidence, deterrence of police misconduct, and ad-
ministration of justice have resulted in a rule that encourages fairer 
trials and proper police conduct. 
In conclusion, the court in Chuyn accurately and correctly ap-
plied New York law in granting defendant’s motion to reopen a pre-
viously held Wade hearing.  Further, examining the New York ap-
proach utilized by the court in Chuyn, and comparing it to the federal 
approach, clearly shows broader protection and superior considera-
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